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DeMarco v. Stoddard: A Compulsory Liability Insurance State Burdens the Consumer 
 
 In 1998, the New Jersey legislature, joining numerous other states, instituted a 
compulsory statute requiring medical professional liability insurance for podiatrists.1  N.J.S.A § 
45:5-5.3 codifies the requirement, mandating that each podiatrist maintaining a professional 
practice in New Jersey must be covered by at least a minimum amount of medical liability 
coverage prescribed by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners (BME).2  The BME then 
established a regulation quantifying that minimum required amount of coverage at “$1 million 
per occurrence and $3 million per policy year.”3 In the event that coverage is unavailable, the 
physician may provide a letter of credit evidencing the minimum amount of funds to cover 
liabilities.4 
Similar to compulsory automobile insurance, medical professional liability insurance is 
meant to insulate the negligent from catastrophic liability payouts while also protecting the 
consumer from the negligent running out of personal funds.5 
In 2015, a Supreme Court of New Jersey ruling established that a New Jersey health care 
consumer can no longer passively rely on compulsory medical malpractice insurance statutes to 
ensure recourse in the event of their medical practitioner’s negligence.6 In DeMarco v. Stoddard, 
the Court held that an insolvent-podiatrist’s insurance company, though having received 
premiums for over three years, would not be obligated to indemnify its previously-insured 
podiatrist named in a malpractice claim because, upon notification of the claim, the insurance 
                                                          
1 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 374 (2015). 
2 N.J.S.A § 45:5-5.3 
3 N.J.A.C §. 13:35–6.18. 
4 Id. 
5 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Medical Professional Liability Insurance, (January 7, 
2016), available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_med_mal.htm. 
6 See DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 374. 
 
company discovered that the podiatrist had misrepresented information in his application for 
obtaining coverage.7 Even with its power to promulgate an equitable ruling, the Court has left an 
injured victim with no choice but to file suit against the negligent podiatrist alone, he who has 
defaulted on his student loans and holds a significant amount of additional debt.8  
Currently, New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance statute, though likely 
unknown to most, promises protection for both the consumer and the practitioner; yet, DeMarco 
seemingly turns that promise upside down and potentially forces a patient to re-think seeking any 
medical help at all, even simple, routine preventative care.9 This Note will explore the decision 
in DeMarco v. Stoddard. First, the Note will discuss the statutory background of New Jersey’s 
compulsory liability insurance statute and the medical malpractice cause of action. This Note 
will further discuss DeMarco v. Stoddard and its implications towards New Jersey’s compulsory 
medical liability insurance statute. This Note will conclude by arguing that DeMarco v. 
Stoddard, though arguably sound in legal analysis, should have been ruled with a more 
appropriate, equitable result.  
 
Part I: Medical Malpractice – a History 
A. The Anatomy of the Medical Malpractice Cause of Action 
Under one form or another, medical malpractice has occurred in the physician-patient 
setting for centuries.10 Dating even as far back as 2030 B.C., the Hammurabi Code stated, “[i]f 
the doctor has treated a gentleman with a lancet of bronze and has caused the gentleman to die, 
                                                          
7 DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 374. 
8 See id. at 369. 
9 See id. 363. 
10 See Melissa Patterson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Product of Insurance Companies and a Threat to 
Women’s Health, QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 109, 112 (citing Melvin M. Belli, Sr., J.D., The Evolution of Medical 
Malpractice Law, Legal Aspects of Medicine, 3 (J.R. Vevaina et al. eds., Springer Verlag 1989)). 
or has opened the abscess of the eye of a gentleman with a bronze lancet, and has caused the loss 
of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hand.”11 Though dramatically stricter than the 
present judicial methods in handling medical malpractice cases, it is clear that governing bodies 
tend to have an interest in ensuring that the everyday medical consumer is at least minimally 
protected by the practitioner’s potential for liability.   
 Medical malpractice arises as a cause of action in tort when a practitioner enters into a 
physician-patient relationship, subsequently deviates from the professional standard of care, and 
that deviation proximately causes the patient’s injury.12 Medical malpractice is the root of a 
consistently present source of injury, damaging the lives of patients across the United States, and 
for that matter, the planet. At first glance, it can be seemingly simple to understand: doctors are 
humans; humans make mistakes. When accounting for intentional deviations from the standard 
of care, it can seem even more plausible that medical malpractice may never be defeated. 
Medical practitioners are aware when entering the profession that this has simply become a 
factor of the job.13 
The availability of a medical malpractice action in tort brings with it various positives 
and negatives to the world of the consumer. On one hand, the practitioner is threatened with 
liability in the absence of acting within the prescribed duty of care because each patient that 
walks through the front door of the professional office has in his pocket the medical malpractice 
cause of action.14 Understandably, when the body is involved, a patient expects nothing short of 
                                                          
11 Id. 
12 See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 23 (2004) (citing Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 (1985); Clark v. Wichman, 
72 N.J. Super. 486, 179 (App. Div. 1962); Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193 (1970)). 
13 16 Am. Jur. Trials § 471 (1969). 
14 See generally Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State 
Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2003). 
perfection from his physician.15 In the event of even the slightest of unfavorable outcomes to the 
patient, the threat of a lawsuit will forever be looming in the background.16 
On the other hand, the availability of this cause of action provides the patient with the 
ability to feel at ease with reliability when seeking medical treatment, knowing that recourse is 
available if injured at the hands of a negligent practitioner.  
Beginning in the 1970s, the size of jury verdicts awarded in successful medical 
malpractice cases rose substantially.17 For example, “[the] average malpractice jury verdicts rose 
from $50,000 and $125,000 in Chicago and San Francisco, respectively, in the 1960s, to 
$600,000 and $450,000 in the 1970s, to $1.2 million in each city in the 1980s.”18 Economically, 
where the potential for liability can stretch as far as the eye can see, a business is to be had in 
providing coverage and indemnification from that liability. In comes medical malpractice 
insurance. 
Medical professional liability insurance, also known as “medical malpractice insurance” 
is a type of professional liability insurance which, when purchased by a physician, releases the 
physician from various amounts of liability “associated with wrongful practices resulting in 
bodily injury, medical expenses and property damage, as well as the cost of defending lawsuits 
related to such claims.”19 Premiums are paid by medical practitioners in exchange for an 
insurance company’s contractually-bound duty to indemnify the practitioner from victims 
seeking recourse.20 Procedurally, a medical practitioner will be named as a defendant to a 
                                                          
15 See id. (citing Sheila L. Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified 
Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1977)). 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 1366. 
18 Id. (quoting Fulton Haight, Dr., Heal Thyself: Strong Medicine for Professional Woes, Legal Times, May 8, 1989, 
at 25). 
19 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Medical Professional Liability Insurance, (January 7, 2016), 
available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_med_mal.htm. 
20 Id.  
medical malpractice cause of action.21 Subsequently, the practitioner will notify the insurance 
company that there is a claim filed against him.22 At this point, the insurer will likely be named 
in the lawsuit; however, most cases with merit tend to end in settlement.23  Though statistically 
unlikely, if and when a medical practice case goes to trial, the litigation can last anywhere from 
months to years.24 Though generally regarded as a much needed form of protection for both the 
physician and the consumer, the existence of medical malpractice insurance has gone through 
various crises since its creation.25 
As previously mentioned, the ever present reality of a patient’s tendency to expect 
nothing less than pristine medical results from their physician has been a prominent factor  
resulting in a plethora of meritless cases flooding the court system.26 This ultimately kicked off 
several major moments in healthcare that have collectively been referred to as the “Medical 
Malpractice Crisis.”27  
In the 1970s, known as the medical malpractice insurance “Crisis of Availability,” this 
first moment of panic had begun when the insurance industry was plagued with an increasing 
number of medical malpractice claims ultimately leading to the following historical moment of 
crisis.28  
Next, in the 1980s, known as the medical malpractice insurance “Crisis of Affordability,” 
the tremendous amount of malpractice claims led to the insurance industry’s substantial increase 
                                                          
21 See id.  
22 See id.  
23 Zachary Matzo, The Trial Process in a Medical Malpractice Lawsuit: An Overview of Each Stage in a Typical 
Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, available at http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/medical-malpractice/trial-process-
lawsuit.html. 
24 Id.  
25 Paul J. Barringer, III, A New Prescription for America's Medical Liability System, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 
235, 237 (2006). 
26 See Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1361, 1362 (2003). 
27 See id.  
28 Id. 
in malpractice insurance premiums.29 This crisis forced physicians to “either cut down on risky 
procedures or leave their practices altogether.”30  
Following, in the late 1990s, an even sharper increase in premium rates occurred due to 
the inclining frequency and severity of consumer claims coupled with the larger payouts awarded 
from the judicial system.31 
Today, theorists believe that the crisis has returned due to the wielding power of the 
lawsuit.32 In an effort to curtail the crisis, various jurisdictions have called upon their legislatures 
to employ various forms of tort reform.33 Generally, legislative efforts have “focus[ed] on 
curtailing medical negligence claims by modifying access to the courts, shifting the costs and 
burdens of litigation from the insurance and the medical industries to plaintiffs and their 
attorneys, and modifying evidentiary and procedural requirements.”34 New Jersey, specifically, 
has included N.J.S.A § 2A:53A-38 in the introduction to its statutory scheme, which embodies 
various New Jersey legislative findings in reference to the medical malpractice insurance crisis.35 
                                                          
29 Barringer, III, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y at 238. 
30 Feigenbaum, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. at 1384; see also Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413 (2006) (citing Steven T. Masada, 
Comment, Australia's “Most Extreme Case”: A New Alternative for U.S. Medical Malpractice Liability Reform, 
13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 163, 164 (2002)). 
31 Barringer, III, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y at 238-39. 
32 See id.  
33 Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1986) 
(stating that from 1975 to 1976, every state legislature made some attempt at tort reform to curtail medical 
malpractice claims. Whether these reforms had any effect on medical malpractice litigation or insurance costs is 
debatable). 
34 Id. (analyzing various tort reform approaches which tend to “cause medical malpractice lawsuits to be a more 
complicated and burdensome procedure for the plaintiff, while implementing no procedure to regulate the insurance 
industry or to reduce the incidence of malpractice.”). 
35 N.J.S.A § 2A:53A-38. 
a. One of the most vital interests of the State is to ensure that high-quality health care continues to be 
available in this State and that the residents of this State continue to have access to a full spectrum of health 
care providers, including highly trained physicians in all specialties; 
b. The State's health care system and its residents' access to health care providers are threatened by a 
dramatic escalation in medical malpractice liability insurance premiums, which is creating a crisis of 
affordability in the purchase of necessary liability coverage for our health care providers; 
c. One particularly alarming result of rising premiums is that there are increasing reports of doctors retiring 
or moving to other states where insurance premiums are lower, dropping high-risk patients and procedures, 
Though the various moments of crisis have tended to be instigated by increasing amounts 
of medical malpractice litigation, there is still the growing amount of malpractice claims with 
actual merit, calling upon more strenuous of consumer protection.36 One method of legislative 
action has been through insurance regulation.37 New Jersey, for example, has favored protection 
for the medical consumer by passing legislation requiring that medical practitioners obtain and 
maintain at least a minimum amount of medical malpractice insurance coverage.38 
B. Statutory Background 
In 1998, the New Jersey legislature implemented its mandatory malpractice insurance for 
podiatrists and physicians.39 This statute, and its 2004 accompanying regulation, mandates that, 
in order to practice medicine in New Jersey, physicians and podiatrists must maintain at least a 
minimum amount of malpractice insurance at $1 million per occurrence and $3 million per 
policy year.40 Failure to comply with this requirement could result in disciplinary action and/or 
various civil penalties, such as “revocation or suspension of the physician’s license to practice 
medicine in this State.”41 
                                                          
and practicing defensive medicine in a manner that may significantly increase the cost of health care for all 
our citizens 
d. The reasons for the steep increases in the cost of medical malpractice liability insurance are complex and 
involve issues related to: the State's tort liability system; the State's health care system, which includes 
issues related to patient safety and medical error reporting; and the State's regulation and requirements 
concerning medical malpractice liability insurers; 
e. It is necessary and appropriate for the State to take meaningful and prompt action to address the various 
interrelated aspects of these issues that are impacted by, or impact on, the State's health care system; and 
f. To that end, this act provides for a comprehensive set of reforms affecting the State's tort liability system, 
health care system and medical malpractice liability insurance carriers to ensure that health care services 
continue to be available and accessible to residents of the State and to enhance patient safety at health care 
facilities. 
36 See generally Qual, n.j12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. at 417.  
37 Id.  
38 N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17. 
39 L. 1997, c. 365, § 1 (codified by N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17); L. 1997, c. 365, § 2 (codified by N.J.S.A § 45:5–5.3). 
40 N.J.S.A § 45:5–5.3; N.J.A.C §. 13:35–6.18. 
41 Jarrell v. Kaul, 223 N.J. 294, 306 (2015) (citing N.J.S.A § 45:1–21). 
Generally, N.J.S.A § 45:9 has been interpreted as “regulat[ing] the practice of medicine and 
further requir[ing] physicians to undertake certain health-related tasks.”42 Unfortunately, there is 
minimal legislative history as to the creation of N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17 specifically; however, the 
committee report evidences that the intent of the bill was to “ensure the citizens of the State that 
they will have some recourse for adequate compensation in the event that a physician or 
podiatrist is found responsible for acts of malpractice.”43 
 
Part II: DeMarco v. Stoddard – A Change in Interpretation 
The seemingly simple statutory mandate for medical malpractice insurance in New Jersey 
was entrenched with a new layer of complexity, handed down by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey in 2015.44 DeMarco v. Stoddard considered the issue as to “whether [a] Rhode Island 
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (RIJUA) must defend and indemnify a 
podiatrist in a medical malpractice action pending in New Jersey following rescission of the 
podiatrist's medical malpractice liability policy.”45 The facts of the case embody a classic 
situation of physician negligence leading to a medical malpractice lawsuit.  
Defendant, Sean Robert Stoddard, D.P.M., practiced as a podiatrist at the Center for 
Advanced Foot & Ankle Care, Inc., in New Jersey, which had offices located in both Toms River 
and Lakewood, New Jersey.46 Further, Dr. Stoddard also maintained a podiatrist’s office in 
                                                          
42 Id. at 308. 
43 Assembly Health Comm., Statement to S. 267 (Sept. 19, 1996). 
44 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
45 Id. at 366. 
46 Id. at 367 
Rhode Island.47 The trial court found Dr. Stoddard’s Rhode Island office to be an insignificant 
portion of his medical business.48 
In 2007, Dr. Stoddard applied for medical malpractice liability insurance through the 
RIJUA, a Rhode Island insurance company.49 Dr. Stoddard specified within the application that 
he was “licensed to practice podiatry in both Rhode Island and New Jersey, that his office 
address was in Newport, Rhode Island, and that he was applying for affiliation with Newport 
Hospital in Rhode Island.”50 Further, Dr. Stoddard listed his New Jersey office telephone number 
on the application.51 The underwriting rules of the RIJUA required that, in order to obtain 
medical malpractice insurance, the applicant must both be licensed to practice in Rhode Island 
and that 51% or more of the physician’s medical practice occurs in Rhode Island.52 The 
application contained a box for the applicant to confirm that at least 51% of the applicant’s 
medical practice was generated in Rhode Island.53 Dr. Stoddard checked this box in affirmance.54 
From 2007 to 2011, Dr. Stoddard honored his arrangement by paying monthly premiums 
in exchange for the RIJUA’s contractual promise to indemnify in the event of a malpractice 
lawsuit.55 From 2007 to 2009, Dr. Stoddard filed renewal applications each year to which he 
included information identical to the inaugural application.56 In 2010, upon receipt of the year’s 
renewal application, Dr. Stoddard listed the Lakewood, New Jersey, office address, as well as its 
                                                          
47 Id.  
48 Id.; see also DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 
(2014) and rev'd, 223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
49 DeMarco 434 N.J. Super. at 361. 
50 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 367 (2015). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 393 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
56 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd, 
223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
corresponding phone number within the application.57 Further, Dr. Stoddard repeatedly affirmed 
the box on the application requesting acknowledgment that at least 51% of the physician’s 
medical practice operated out of Rhode Island.58  
From 2004 to 2011, Plaintiff, Thomas DeMarco, was under Dr. Stoddard’s care and 
supervision for treatment related to Chronic Plantar Fasciitis.59 Typically, this illness involves 
discomfort caused by “an inflammation of the tough, fibrous brand of tissue connecting the heel 
bone to the base of the toes.”60 DeMarco was officially diagnosed with a split peroneal tendon.61 
In response to this diagnosis, Dr. Stoddard performed three separate surgical procedures 
throughout the duration of their medical relationship.62 The basis of DeMarco’s complaint is 
formed from the circumstances of the September 2010 third and final surgery.63 
In September, Dr. Stoddard performed the final foot surgery just before informing 
DeMarco that he would be terminating his New Jersey practice in favor of moving to 
California.64 Over the subsequent months, DeMarco’s foot condition grew worse and was forced 
to undergo two additional surgeries from a separate physician.65 Subsequently, DeMarco filed a 
medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Stoddard in New Jersey.66 
The complaint alleged that “[Dr.] Stoddard had negligently performed the September 
2010 foot surgery.”67 The complaint and summons were served to Dr. Stoddard in California 
                                                          
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 367 (2015). 
60 25 Westlaw Journal Professional Liability 7 (2016). 
61 DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 367. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd, 
223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
and, subsequently, forwarded to the RIJUA, per procedure.68 The RIJUA responded to the 
documents with a reversion of rights letter stating, the “RIJUA only provides coverage for 
physicians who maintain [51%] of their ‘professional time and efforts’ in Rhode Island” and that 
the RIJUA was “in the process of securing facts concerning whether [Dr. Stoddard] ... met the 
[51%] requirement for the provision of insurance coverage from the [RI]JUA.”69 At this point, 
once the RIJUA had performed additional research after the complaint had been filed, the RIJUA 
had rescinded its insurance policy on the basis that Dr. Stoddard had misrepresented that 51% of 
his medical practice was operating within Rhode Island.70 Subsequently, the RIJUA refunded Dr. 
Stoddard’s premiums paid for the period of March 2010 through January 2011.71 All previous 
premiums were not returned to Dr. Stoddard.72 
On March 9, 2012, DeMarco filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
in New Jersey. 73 The amended complaint sought a ruling that the RIJUA must indemnify Dr. 
Stoddard for the malpractice claim.74 Both the RIJUA and DeMarco filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment seeking a ruling on whether “the RIJUA was required to defend and 
indemnify Dr. Stoddard.”75 The RIJUA’s motion alleged that Dr. Stoddard had procured their 
services through methods of misrepresentation, specifically, in falsely affirming the portion of 
the application requiring at least 51% of the practitioner’s medical practice operating within 
                                                          
68 Id.  
69 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 368 (2015). 
70 Id. at 386. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd, 
223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
74 Id. 
75 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 369 (2015). The case also includes an issue involving a choice of law 
analysis. The trial court ruled that New Jersey law would govern; however, this issue will not be discussed in further 
detail within this note.  
Rhode Island.76  The trial court ruled in favor of DeMarco on both motions.77 The court held that, 
even though Dr. Stoddard misrepresented facts on his application for insurance, “compulsory 
insurance cannot be voided as to an innocent third party.”78 
The RIJUA motioned the Appellate Division for leave to appeal.79 Upon considering the 
legal issue as to “whether a medical malpractice insurance carrier may rescind a policy so that 
the carrier has no duty to indemnify the insured doctor for injuries suffered by an innocent third 
party who made a malpractice claim before the policy was rescinded,” the Appellate Division 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the RIJUA was required to indemnify Dr. 
Stoddard.80 The court stated,  
“The rescission remedy available to an insurance carrier may preclude the insured doctor 
from demanding coverage when he gave materially false information in his application 
for insurance, but that remedy does not permit a malpractice policy to be voided from its 
inception and in its entirety when an innocent patient seeks coverage.”81 
 Finally, the RIJUA motioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey for leave to appeal.82 
The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.83 The Court held that the RIJUA owed no 
duty to indemnify or defend Dr. Stoddard in the medical malpractice action.84 
 
Part III: The Supreme Court of New Jersey Has Stifled the Medical Consumer 
                                                          
76 DeMarco, 434 N.J. Super. at 362. 
77 Id. at 371. 
78 Id. 
79 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 370 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd, 
223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
80 Id. at 367. 
81 Id. at 370 (citing Dillard v. Hertz Claim Mgmt., 277 N.J. Super. 448, 451 (App. Div. 1994) aff'd, 144 N.J. 326 
(1996)). 
82 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 218 N.J. 270 (2014). 
83 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 384 (2015). 
84 Id. 
 In DeMarco, the Court turned its back on the medical consumer in reversing the 
Appellate Division when interpreting New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance 
statute without implementing a more equitable ruling.85 With intensity, the Court acted swiftly in 
disapproval when discussing the Appellate Division’s actions in analogizing compulsory medical 
liability insurance with the present-day compulsory automobile liability insurance model, in 
favor of comparing it rather to legal malpractice insurance and other forms of professional 
liability insurance.86 In doing so, the Court stated, “[I]t is well established in this State that a 
professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional 
liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer.”87  
 The majority’s ruling has significant meaning for this context, in particular, because of 
the facts surrounding this case. The ruling effectively makes it nearly impossible for the injured 
third-party to have the ability to obtain recourse from the judicial system.88 The defendant-
podiatrist has been unsuccessful in his efforts to practice medicine in California and is still in 
debt, recovering from student loan default.89 This ruling begs the question as to whether there is 
a mandate that the everyday medical consumer must do an extensive background check on her 
doctor in order to feel comfortable going in for medical treatment. 
                                                          
85 See id. at 363. 
86 Id. at 366 (“We also conclude that the compulsory automobile insurance model has no relevance to the remedial 
response to a fraudulently obtained policy of professional liability insurance and the effect of rescission on innocent 
third parties.”) 
87 Id. at 379. The issue on appeal is not whether or not the insurer had the right to rescind the policy. The Court          
concluded that the insurer did have the right to rescind the contract.  
“A misrepresentation makes a contract voidable if a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a 
fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, 
the contract is voidable by the recipient. Susan Koehler Sullivan, David A. Ring, Recurring Issues in 
Rescission Cases, 42 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 51, 52 (2006) (citing Section 164(1) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 164(1)).  
88 See generally DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
89 Id. at 369. 
As Justice Albin’s dissent argues, the majority’s approach rests on reasoning that 
completely contravenes New Jersey’s public policy.90 Justice Albin states, “The aim of the law is 
to provide financial protection to every patient in the State.” With no existence of controlling 
precedent on point supporting the majority’s position, the majority has left a consumer without 
any real possibility in receiving adequate recourse, yet the insurance company has walked away 
with a windfall in insurance premiums.91 The insurance company has been allowed to accept 
insurance premiums, wait to be notified that there is a pending claim against one of its 
“insureds,” and, subsequently, devote its resources to research if is a possible road out of its 
obligation exists.92 Upon finding that road out, it may completely rescind its contract, without an 
ounce of reprimand for failing to put in a good faith effort to ensure that this problem was 
extinguished at the outset.   
The DeMarco dissent, in agreeance with the trial court and Appellate Division, embodies 
the theme that “every patient has a right to presume that his physician is in compliance with the 
law.”93 As the DeMarco majority mentioned, there has been miniscule amounts of case law 
interpreting compulsory liability insurance statutes specific to physicians and podiatrists required 
to maintain medical malpractice liability insurance.94 In New Jersey alone, there has only been 
one other case addressing the issue as to the consequences to an injured third party when a 
medical malpractice liability insurance policy has been rescinded by the insurer, including this 
case under discussion; however, the case does not discuss the present issue.95  
                                                          
90 Id. at 385 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 389. (Albin, J., dissenting). Justice Albin states, “the RIJUA in this case has reaped a windfall—it pocketed 
three years of premiums, backdated a rescission, and is not required to expend a single dollar of collected premiums 
to compensate the innocent patient and his wife victimized by Dr. Stoddard's alleged medical malpractice.”  
92 See generally DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015). 
93 Id. at 384. (Albin, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 375. 
95 Id. (citing Jarrell v. Kaul, 223 N.J. 294, 297 (2015)). 
When there is an absence of controlling precedent, courts typically look to other areas of 
reasonably similar situations in order to respect the intent of the legislature.96 Therefore, the 
Court chose to analyze various other forms of compulsory liability insurance schemes and how 
various court interpretations as influential in its decision-making process.97  
Though insufficient case law on point, the case law interpreting various other compulsory 
insurance statutes have drawn a distinctions between “the party who procures an insurance 
policy through misrepresentations and the innocent party who plays no role in a fraud on the 
insurer and is a victim falling within the coverage protections of the insurance policy.”98 Fisher 
explains, “The insurance carrier's liability to its [in]sured who may be guilty of some act or 
conduct which renders a policy void ab initio is therefore distinct from its liability to an injured 
third person.”99 Thus, “an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or misrepresentations relating to 
the inception of the policy, retrospectively avoid coverage under a compulsory or financial 
responsibility insurance law so as to escape liability to a third party.”100 
 
A. Protecting the Party Who Plays No Role in a Fraud in the Absence of Controlling 
Precedent 
In recognition of an absence of any controlling precedent, the DeMarco Appellate Division 
began its plunge into similar areas of the law analysis by comparing the New Jersey compulsory 
medical liability insurance statute with the similarly applicable compulsory automobile insurance 
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statute and legal malpractice insurance statutes.101 With an understanding that there are no 
directly relevant cases on point to decide this issue, the Appellate Division seemed to take a 
presumption that New Jersey would seek to protect the interests of innocent third parties.102  
 
1. Compulsory Automobile Insurance Statutes 
The New Jersey legislature implemented N.J.S.A § 39:6A-3, a compulsory automobile 
insurance coverage statute, which requires that every owner of an automobile in New Jersey 
must maintain a minimum amount of automobile liability insurance coverage.103 This statutory 
requirement for automobile insurance was “designed to ensure that the persons injured in motor 
vehicle accidents are compensated promptly for their injuries and financial losses by immediate 
recourse to insurance or public funds.”104 In various states where no statutory requirement exists, 
one can imagine a scenario all too often occurring in which a driver, through no fault of her own, 
is hit by an uninsured or underinsured motorist. The innocent driver’s ability for recovery is at 
the mercy of the chance that this faulty driver actually has funds to cover the losses. The New 
Jersey requirement ensures that all drivers will be covered by insurance in efforts to prevent this 
injustice from continuing to occur.105 
In the case of compulsory automobile insurance, New Jersey courts have generally concluded 
that “the rescission remedy available to insurance carriers when a policy was procured by means 
of a material misrepresentation may not infringe upon the rights of innocent third parties who 
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might need to rely on insurance coverage to compensate them for their injuries.”106 Essentially, 
the courts have ruled in favor of the innocent consumer.107 For example, in Marotta, the court 
held that a driver has the “right to expect that all other drivers will be insured to the extent 
required by compulsory insurance.”108  
In Fisher v. New Jersey Auto, Thomas Lafferty applied for automobile insurance through 
New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association.109 Within the application, 
Lafferty was requested to list the various vehicles that were registered under his name, along 
with their accompanying Vehicle Identification Number and license plate number.110 Lafferty 
was quickly approved for insurance.111 One month later, Plaintiff, a passenger in the Lafferty 
vehicle, was injured in a collision with another automobile.112 Plaintiff did not have automobile 
insurance coverage in her household so she applied for benefits through the policy issued to 
Lafferty.113 After the insurer researched the claim, Lafferty was notified that his policy was 
deemed void ab initio due to his “[failure] to register his vehicle as required by N.J.S.A § 
17:30E-3m in order to be considered a qualified applicant under the plan.”114 Subsequently, the 
premiums were returned and Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was denied.115 Plaintiff brought suit 
against the insurance company claiming that, as an injured third-party, “she should not have been 
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precluded from claiming PIP benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act 
… simply because Lafferty-the insured-failed to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in 
N.J.S.A § 17:30E-3m.”116 The court held, “even though Lafferty's misrepresentations may have 
rendered the insurance policy void ab initio as to him, we hold that Hanover cannot now avoid 
liability to plaintiff for PIP coverage by declaring the insurance policy null and void after the 
accident.”117 
Fisher can almost be seen as a parallel universe of relationships to the present case between 
the podiatrist and the patient. Here, Dr. Stoddard was required by statute to obtain medical 
liability insurance.118 Similarly, the driver in Fisher was required to obtain automobile 
insurance.119 Both parties in each case had made material representations on their applications 
for insurance, which allowed the insurer to rescind the policy.120 Further, both instances involved 
an innocent third party becoming injured.121 Though factually similar, Fisher and DeMarco 
arrived at different conclusions.122 Fisher, on the one hand, employed the widely held approach 
that, “an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or misrepresentations relating to the inception of 
the policy, retrospectively avoid coverage under a compulsory or financial responsibility 
insurance law so as to escape liability to a third party.”123 DeMarco, following no precedent on 
point, ruled in favor of allowing the insurer to avoid coverage. 124 
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The DeMarco majority attempted to analyze the compulsory automobile insurance line of 
cases from the present situation, ultimately stating, “The compulsory automobile insurance 
model has no relevance to the remedial response to a fraudulently obtained policy of professional 
liability insurance and the effect of rescission on innocent third parties.”125 The majority attempts 
to bolster its argument by distinguishing the compulsory automobile liability insurance model 
with the medical liability insurance model by claiming that the former has “created an 
expectation among those operating motor vehicles that every individual who may be in an 
accident will be insured.”126 Does New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance statute 
not create this expectation as well? As referred to in Part I, the intent of the legislature when 
creating the medical liability insurance requirement was to “ensure the citizens of the State that 
they will have some recourse for adequate compensation in the event that a physician or 
podiatrist is found responsible for acts of malpractice.”127 This statute should allow the patient-
consumer to have the presumption that all physicians in New Jersey will be insured. The 
DeMarco majority seems to think otherwise.128 
Disqualifying the compulsory automobile insurance model from influence, the DeMarco 
majority follows by analyzing interpretations of the compulsory legal malpractice statutes for 
guidance in its decision.129 
 
2. Compulsory Legal Malpractice Statutes  
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In 1997, the New Jersey legislature established N.J.S.A § 14A:17-1.130 This statute mandates 
that lawyers who choose to organize in professional corporations or limited liability partnerships 
must purchase and maintain legal malpractice insurance.131 In comparing this type of compulsory 
insurance statute, it is key to note that, unlike automobile insurance and medical malpractice 
insurance, New Jersey does not require that all who enter the legal field obtain legal malpractice 
insurance.132 Regardless of that point, New Jersey courts have adjudicated various cases 
involving those lawyers qualifying to be required to obtain legal malpractice insurance. Similar 
to the cases interpreting compulsory automobile insurance, a distinction has been drawn in this 
setting between “the insured as the wrongdoer and an innocent third party.”133 
In First American Title Insurance Co. v. Lawson, a three-member law firm was established 
as a Limited Liability Company in New Jersey.134 While the third member, Snyder, remained 
innocent and unaware, the other two, Lawson and Wheeler, had been involved in a kiting 
scheme.135 Lawson had discovered that the other culprit, Wheeler, had been “transferring money 
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improperly from various client accounts … into other client accounts and into the firm’s business 
account.”136 Upon confronting Wheeler, Lawson decided to go along with the scheme.137 
Upon receiving three grievances regarding the firm’s handling of certain transactions, the 
Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) conducted an audit of the firm’s books which ultimately 
resulted in the disbarment of Lawson and various claims from victims of the scheme.138 Once 
named as defendants in the various claims, the firm notified its insurer.139  
The firm had maintained the statutorily required minimum amount of legal malpractice 
insurance; however, the insurance company sought to release itself from the obligation to 
indemnify based on the argument that the firm’s managing partner had knowingly made material 
misrepresentations when he applied for the insurance.140 The material misrepresentation referred 
to involves a warranty statement signed by Wheeler.141 The warranty specifically asked, “After 
inquiry, is any attorney in your firm aware of: … B. Any acts, error or omissions in professional 
services that may reasonably be expected to be the basis of a professional liability claim?”142 
Wheeler checked the box marked “NO” and subsequently signed the warranty statement 
asserting to the insurer that the information on the application was accurate.143 
  The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision with respect 
to releasing the insurer from the obligation to indemnify with respect to the two wrongdoers; 
however, not with respect to the firm’s innocent third-party member.144 In a decision based on 
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equitable principles and public policy, the court reasoned that “rescinding the policy as to the 
innocent member was inconsistent with the public policy of protecting consumers of legal 
services with malpractice insurance.”145 
Though the court ruled in favor of the innocent third-party, the DeMarco majority attempts to 
use its decision in Lawson to bolster its current decision, interpreting that the rule in Lawson as, 
“Upon rescission, the insurer owes no duty to defend or indemnify the law firm or any 
defalcating attorney of the firm for any complaints pending or claims that accrued at the time of 
rescission.”146 However, because the majority decided to let the innocent third member of the 
firm continue to claim coverage from the insurer, Lawson stands for the position that a balancing 
of equities is the appropriate measure in analyzing this type of issue.147 Rather than a governing 
rule to deny insurance coverage to the innocent patient, the DeMarco majority should have 
interpreted Lawson as requiring the court to balance the equities in a totality of the circumstances 
approach based on public policy. 
While it may be only two members of the dissent of which agree with the Appellate 
Division’s decision to use a more equitable approach with a balancing of equities, this approach 
is the proper one that should have been used to influence the majority’s decision.148 The New 
Jersey courts have never adjudicated this issue with relation to compulsory medical malpractice 
insurance statutes.149 Instead of deciding to consider other factors in a broad scope analysis, the 
majority attempted to scurry up what it could do to make stretching arguments by analogizing 
this statute to how courts have interpreted “similar” statutes.150 Even though the courts have 
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frequently interpreted compulsory statutes as being protective of the innocent third-party, the 
Court failed to approach the issue with a balancing of the equities. Had the Court done so in this 
fashion, not only would the innocent third party would be adequately protected from what he 
never could have anticipated, but the Court could have, at the outset, left it to the legislature to 
come up with a fix for this problem of discrepancy as to whether an innocent third-party should 
suffer based on the physician’s actions.  
Even though both Fisher and Lawson act as persuasive authority in influencing the majority 
to rule in favor of the innocent third-party, neither of the cases involve the compulsory medical 
malpractice insurance statutes. At this point, the Court would have been correct to rule in favor 
of the innocent third party as a matter of public policy. 
 
3. Public Policy 
The DeMarco majority, ruling in favor of the insurance company, concluded by stating, “We 
have not identified any sound reason to treat medical professionals any differently than other 
similarly situated professionals.”151 Strangely enough, other similarly situated professionals, as 
in Lawson, have been afforded with an analysis into public policy where there is an absence of 
precedent directly on point to help decide the issue.152 The DeMarco majority should have 
followed up their similar statutory analysis with an analysis into public policy before making its 
conclusion.  
Public policy has been argued to influence the resolution of every single legal dispute.153 
Though fairly difficult to implement a black letter ruling on exactly what is meant by “public 
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policy,” courts have regularly posited, “When we speak of public policy, ‘we mean the law of 
the state, whether found in the Constitution, the statutes, or judicial records.’”154 
 As the DeMarco dissent states, “The approach taken by the majority is at complete odds 
with our State’s public policy, which finds expression in our compulsory medical malpractice 
insurance law. The aim of the law is to provide financial protection to every patient in the 
State.”155 However, there also is said to be a public policy of the State to discourage fraudulent 
conduct against an insurer.156 When comparing the public policy of the State, the Court would 
have been appropriate to use a balancing of the equities approach in deciding which decision 
would have better yielded less contravention to public policy.  
Balancing the equities is a term of art, which, procedurally, is used to describe a weighing 
game that courts undertake typically in cases where there is no precedent directly on point, to 
weigh, based on the totality of the circumstances, any harms each side to a controversy would 
suffer in the absence of relief from the courts.157 This process allows the courts to see, from a 
bird’s eye view, exactly who and what the policy implications would effect given all potential 
outcomes from a case.158 
In a balancing the equities approach, the Court would have taken into account the public 
policy concerns that have been alluded to through the DeMarco decision. On the one hand, New 
Jersey’s public policy hopes to provide financial protection from every patient in the State.159 On 
                                                          
154 Id. (citing State ex rel. Scott v. Dircks, 111 S.W. 1, 3 (Mo. 1908)). 
Broader definitions, vague as they might be, characterize public policy as the principle that “no one can 
lawfully do that which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Public policy has even 
been declared to be synonymous with “the public good.” It has been referred to as the “purpose and spirit 
of the substantive laws of a state …” 
155 DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 380 (2015) (Albin, J., dissenting). 
156 Paul F. Clark, Foot Doctor Defeated in Action for Rescission, December 3, 2015, available at 
http://blog.wcmlaw.com/2015/12/foot-doctor-defeated-in-action-for-rescission-nj/. 
157 See 3 N.Y.Prac., Com. Litig. in New York State Courts § 18:10 (4th ed.). 
158 See id. 
159 DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 381 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
the other hand, New Jersey acts against any kind of condoning of fraudulent activity against an 
insurer.160 
When considering both sides in a totality of the circumstances, the Court should have 
unmistakably concluded that the innocent third party would be more severely injured by an 
unfavorable decision with less contravention to public policy, as opposed to the insurance 
company, which was in the best position to have uncovered Dr. Stoddard’s misrepresentation 
well in advance of the third party’s injury.161 The dissent states, “The RIJUA was in the best 
position to ferret out any misrepresentation made by Dr. Stoddard when he applied and reapplied 
for malpractice insurance coverage. The innocent patient was in no position to do so.”162  
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
It is no longer safe to assume that obtaining medical care is the smartest thing that you can do 
for your body. It is evident that the decision in DeMarco v. Stoddard turned the consumer’s 
market for medical treatment on its head. As in New Jersey, compulsory medical liability 
insurance statutes were meant to ensure that patients were given financial protection in the case 
of a negligent physician. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has ruled that, even where medical 
liability insurance is required by statute, the consumer cannot always rely on the courts to ensure 
that the patient will receive the recourse they are promised in a situation of a physician’s 
misrepresentation to his insurance provider.  
This issue was well deserving of an analysis into the public policy of New Jersey, which 
ultimately would have led to a balancing of the equities. Unfortunately, it is now left to the 
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discretion of the legislature to ensure that the decision will not have adverse effects on the 
medical community. The legislature should act quickly to ensure that a situation like this does 
not happen again by implementing various safeguards to ensure that courts interpret the 
compulsory liability statute in line with their clear intent in creating the statute. 
 
  
